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REVISION OF THE ITALIAN PEACE TREATY
NORMAN KOGAN*
Recent efforts of the Italian Government to obtain revision of the
Italian Peace Treaty have encountered the refusal of certain of the
signatories, particularly the Soviet Union, to countenance such revision
save on terms unacceptable to the Italians. As a consequence the Italian
Government announced, on December 21, 1951, that certain armaments
and other clauses of the peace settlement were no longer binding. This
stand was repeated on February 8, 1952, as a result of the fifth Soviet
veto of Italy's application for United Nations' membership.' These
moves had the support of Italy's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, especially the United States. The purpose of this discus-
sion is to examine the claims which may be advanced to support legal
denunciation under such circumstances, and to advance some comments
on the political aspects of American encouragement of these actions.
While treaties, particularly multilateral treaties, have some attributes
of international legislation they also partake of the nature of contracts
as understood in municipal law. They are generally considered to be
agreements between two or more states relating to various matters of
concern in conformity to law.2 Like contracts, treaties, unless there are
stipulations to the contrary embodied in the agreement, can be revised
only with consent of all parties concerned.- The Italian Peace Treaty
of 1947 is a typical peace treaty.4 With one possible exception, the docu-
* Assistant Professor of Government and International Relations, The University
of Connecticut.
1. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1951, p. 1,'col. 2, and Feb. 10, 1952, p. 1, col. 6 contains
official announcements and texts of the Italian notes.
2. WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (3d ed. 1939).
3. "Treaties . . . which are apparently intended, or expressly concluded, for
the purpose of setting up an everlasting condition of things . . . are as a rule not
terminable by notice, although they can be dissolved by mutual consent of the
contracting parties. All treaties of peace, and all boundary treaties belong to this
class. History records many cases in which treaties of peace have not established
an everlasting condition of things. . . . But this does not prove either that such
treaties can lawfully be dissolved through giving notice, or that, at any rate as far
as International Law is concerned, they are not intended to create an everlasting condi-
tion of things." 1 OPPENtEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 791-792 (6th ed., Lauterpacht,
1947).
4. The official English text is contained in U.S. TaEAT SER. No. 1648 (Dep't
State 1947).
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ment contains no provision for termination, denunciation or revision.5
On the face of it, an everlasting condition of affairs has been created.
As a consequence, a legal basis for the revision of this treaty must be
found in general principles of International Law.
Mutual Consent
The recognized requirement for revision of a treaty is consent of
all the signatories. This principle received its classic statement in 1871
when Czarist Russia, taking advantage of the Franco-Prussian War,
repudiated the Black Sea restrictions of the Treaty -of Paris of 1856.
In the Treaty of London of 1871 the powers party to the Treaty of
Paris agreed to release Russia from the restrictions but at the same time
declared: "It is an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no
power can free itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify its
terms, except with the consent of the contracting parties by means of
a friendly understanding." This declaration was reaffirmed by the
Council of the League of Nations in 1935 in condemning Germany's
repudiation of the military articles of the Treaty of Versailles.7 The
requirement of mutual consent is so well established that further sub-
stantiation is hardly necessary.
Natural Right of Effective Self-Defense
It has sometimes ben claimed that the right of effective self-defense
is so basic as to overcome treaty provisions which drastically reduce the
effective defensive capabilities of a state. This position is derived from
the broader legal conception that "a state cannot be expected to sacrifice
its very existence to uphold its treaty obligations."'8 Presumably being
relatively disarmed in an armed world creates the danger of such a
sacrifice. The basis of such a derivation from the general principle is
weak. Legally it runs into the qualification that "a treaty . . . becomes
voidable so soon as it is dangerous to the life or incompatible with the
independence of a state, provided that its injurious effects are not
intended by the two contracting parties at the time of its conclusion." 9
Since the injurious effects of unilateral disarmament are precisely in-
tended by the victors and accepted by the vanquished in a treaty of peace,
the argument fails.
5. See p. 339, infra for a discussion of this possibility.
6. 61 BRisH AND FOREIGN STATE PAi.as 7 (1877).
7. JOURNAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 551 (1935).
8. FExwicK, INTERNATiONAL LAW 454 (3d ed. 1948).
9. HALL, A TREATIsE ON INTERNATIoNAL LAw 415 (8th ed., Higgins, 1924).
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The right of effective self-defense is essentially non-juridical. It
establishes a political standard, the right of a state to be a power among
the powers. Armaments restrictions are an additional factor, among
others, which limit Italy's relative power position in the world.' 0 But
few nations today, including most of the victors of World War II, are
by themselves capable of erecting an effective defense against one of the
super-powers. Italy is no worse off in this respect than the other states.
Soviet Failure to Keep Its Pledge
One Italian justication for denunciation is the allegation that the
Soviet Union has failed to honor its obligation to support Italy's appli-
cation for membership in the United Nations. This pledge appears in
the preamble to the Peace Treaty:
. . . the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy are de-
sirous of concluding a treaty of peace . . . thereby enabling
the Allied and Associated Powers to support Italy's application
to become a member of the United Nations .... 11
In interpreting the sense of these words it is customary to look at their
grammatical meaning. The International Court of Justice has said:
: * , the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to
interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavor
to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning
in the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in
their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their con-
text, that is an end of the matter. If, on the other hand, the
words in their natural and ordinary meaning are ambiguous
or lead to an unreasonable result, then, and then only, must the
Court, by resort to other methods of interpretation, seek to
ascertain what the parties really did mean when they used these
words. 12
Applying this standard it might seem questionable that the preamble
cited above creates a binding obligation. The phrase "thereby enabling
the Allied and Associated Powers to support Italy's application" appears
merely to create a situation in which certain action may take place in
the future. This interpretation receives further support upon an ex-
amination of the Italian text of the Treaty. The key words of the Italian
10. On the factors of power see SPRouT, FouNDATIoNs oF NATIONAL PoWER (2d
ed. 1951).
11. U.S. TREATY SER., op. cit. supra note 4, at 126.
12. Competence of Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J., 4, 8 (March 3, 1950) ; 44 Am. J. INT'L L. 582, 584, (1950).
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version read as follows--"pernzettendo cosi alle Potenze Alleate ed
Associate di appoggiare le dontande che l'Italia presenteri .. ."13 Lit-
erally-"thereby permitting the Allied and Associated Powers to support
the application Italy -will make... " "Permettendo" is even less
obligatory than the English word "enabling.' 1 4 A reasonable construc-
tion of the text might lead to the conclusion that completion of the
Treaty becomes a prerequisite to further action which the victor powers
may take but are not obliged to take in their capacity as members of the
United Nations.
The problem which arises, however, is whether this interpretation
actually represents the intention of the States which wrote the Treaty.
The Italians maintain, of course, that the preamble created a binding
obligation to support their application. They did not write the document;
the victors merely handed it to them for their signature. Britain, France
and the United States, which did participate in the writing of the docu-
ment have, however, backed the Italian position. In their view, pre-
sumably, a binding obligation was created. Of course it may well be
argued that they are supporting Italy for political reasons rather than
for the cogency of the Italian interpretation.
The remaining major party which wrote the Treaty is the Soviet
Union. Its interpretation is given in the following extract from a note
addressed to the Italian Government on February 24, 1952:
In its Note the Italian Government represents the matter
as if the Soviet Union were hindering Italy's admission to the
United Nations, thus violating its obligations under the Peace
Treaty with Italy. Such an assertion is contrary to reality and
is a distortion of the generally known facts.
As is known, the Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed
that Italy be admitted to the United Nations, together with
other States having a lawful right to this, including States
which during the war were in the same position as Italy. With
regard to these States the Soviet Union, like other countries
which signed the Peace Treaties in Paris on February 10, 1947,
13. U.S. TREATY SER., op. cit. supra note 4, at 374.
14. An instructive precedent is the debate over the armaments clauses of the
Treaty of Versailles. The preamble to the section on German disarmament reads:
"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments
of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air
clauses which follow." Treaty of Peace unth Germany, SEN. Doc. No. 51, p. 191,
66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919). This became the basis of subsequent German claims
that the Allies were under an obligation to disarm. The Allies insisted, however, on
the non-binding nature of the provision upon themselves. For a description of the
debate see The Treaty of Versailles and After, U.S. CONFERENCE SER. No. 92, p. 309
(Dep't State 1947).
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also has the obligation to support their requests for admission
to the United Nations.
15
It appears that the Soviet Union recognizes that the preamble
creates an obligation. The agreement of the major drafters of the
Treaty on this point, as a result, can be said to override the interpreta-
tion of the text given above. The Soviet Union has not recognized,
however, that it violated its obligations." What its note to Italy failed
to mention was that when the applications were voted upon individually
in the Security Council the Soviet Union vetoed Italy's application. In
essence Russia was attempting to tie the admission of Italy to that of
Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary, other ex-enemy states which are now
Soviet satellites. That the Soviet Union on several occasions has ex-
pressed no objections to Italy's admission,1 7 cannot gainsay the fact
that Russia has voted against admission.
A question arises concerning the action of the Western Allies
towards the application for admission of Roumania, Bulgaria and
Hungary. The peace treaties with these nations contain the exact pledge
in their preambles that appears in the Italian Treaty.' 8 Yet, in the past,
Britain, France and the United States have voted against their admission.
Have the Western Allies violated their obligations?
The United States, France and Britain have voted against these
states on the grounds they did not possess the qualifications for admission
prescribed in the United Nations Charter.' 9 The International Court of
Justice has already stated in an advisory opinion that Members of the
15. The English text is published in SoviET NEws, No. 2633, March 1, 1952, p. 4
(published by the Soviet Embassy, London).
16. Ibid. "At the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly which
closed in February this year, the Soviet Union again submitted a proposal that Italy
and thirteen other States be admitted to United Nations membership. On January 25
the Political Committee of the General Assembly adopted this Soviet proposal by a
majority vote, with the delegation of the United States voting against it and the
delegations of Great Britain and France abstaining. Only as a result of crude
pressure exerted by the United States on the delegations of other countries was the
Soviet proposal, which had been approved by the Political Committee, not accepted
at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly. When the proposal of the U.S.S.R.
was taken up in the Security Council on February -6, the -United- States delegation
again voted against this proposal, while the delegations of Great Britain and France
abstained, and this prevented the admission of Italy and thirteen other. States to the
United Nations."
17. Journal of the Security Council, No. 81 at 2127 (Aug. 21, 1947).
18. U.S. TREATY SER. Nos. 1649, 1650, 1651 (Dept. State 1947).
19. "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states
which accept the obligations contained in the present charter and, in the judgment of
the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations." U.N. CHAR=
Art. 4, 1f 1. The grounds for rejection have been that these satellites violate human
rights and fundamental freedoms. Journal of the Security Council, No. 81 at 2119,
2131, 2132 (Aug. 21, 1947).
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United Nations in acting on applications for membership, must take into
account only those criteria set forth in Article 4 of the Charter and
nothing else.20 It would appear that in order to live up to their obliga-
tions under the Charter, the Western Allies must violate their obligations
under the Peace Treaties. This is not so, for the former overrides the
latter.2
1
The Soviet Union has preferred not to take advantage of the cover
offered by Article 4 of the Charter to justify its vote against Italy. The
criteria are sufficiently subjective to leave considerable latitude. For
example, Russia could claim Italy is not a "peace-loving nation" for it
is a member of what the Soviet Union has already called "that aggressive,
war-mongering North Atlatic Treaty Organization." Since the Soviets
have admitted Italy's qualifications, however, this escape is not available
to them. It appears that the Soviet Union has violated its obligations
under the Peace Treaty, which remains in force.
While recognizing violation of the obligation, it still remains ques-
tionable that the Italian Government could denounce the Peace Treaty
as it applied to Russia and announce an intention to rearm beyond its
limits. Can a treaty be denounced on a claim that another party has
failed to live up to it? After a careful examination of the problem two
students of the issue reached the following conclusions:
Furthermore, it is submitted that customary international
law, as revealed by the actual practice of states and as dis-
tinguished from the theoretical statements of publicists and the
arguments of diplomats, does not recognize such a right [uni-
lateral denunciation on the ground of violation by other par-
ties]. Attempts actually to exercise the right appear to have
been remarkably rare, and when the attempt has been made the
existence of the right has been vigorously denied by the other
states concerned. 22
This conclusion is supported in almost identical language by the
group of scholars who produced the Harvard Research in International
Law. 23 This group went on to recommend that the complaining party,
if it had provisionally suspended performance of its treaty obligations,
20. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations,
I.C.J. (May 28, 1948).
21. "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other inter-
national agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." U.N.
CHAmR Art. 103.
22. Garner and Jobst, The Unilateral Denmenciation of Treaties by One Party
Because of Alleged Non-Performance by Another Party or Parties, 29 Am. J. INT'L L.
569, 581 (1935).
23. "In the light of what little practice there is, as distinguished from the theoretical
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submit the question to a competent international tribunal or authority.
In case of a favorable decision the provisional suspension may become
definitive; if the decision is to the contrary the party suspending per-
formance may itself be held liable for failure to perform its own ob-
ligations.2 4
Given this conclusion, the unilateral Italian action appears highly
irregular. It is also doubtful whether the Italian Government could
ignore the disarmament clauses of the Peace Treaty on these grounds.
Italy's duty to disarm to specified levels is not an obligation to the Soviet
Union alone but to all the Allied and Associated Powers. Although a
number of the latter have voluntarily agreed to revision of the armaments
clauses, 25 others of them have not done so. Such signatories of the
Treaty as Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia can be
presumed to support Soviet attitudes toward revision. There is no evi-
dence that Yugoslavia or Ethiopia agreed to the Italian requests. As
Italy has not charged them with violation of its rights it is assumed the
obligations of Italy to them remain standing. The Harvard Draft Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties provides that:
Two or more of the States parties to a treaty to which
other States are parties may make a later treaty which will
supersede the earlier treaty in their relations inter se, only if
this is not forbidden by the provisions of the earlier treaty and
if the later treaty is not so inconsistent with the general purpose
of the earlier treaty as to frustrate that purpose.26
The agreement of Britain, France and the United States to permit Italy
to rearm is completely inconsistent with the disarmament clauses of the
statements of writers and the arguments of diplomats, it is submitted that a State
does not have the right to terminate a treaty as between itself and a party to the
treaty which it alone considers to have failed to fulfill its obligations under the treaty.
It would seem, certainly, that at most... a State may provisionally suspend performance
of its obligations under a treaty vis-a-zis a party which fails to fulfill its obligations
thereunder, pending the alteration or termination of the treaty by mutual agreement
of the parties thereto. This is very different from a right of unilaterial termination."
Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 1089 (Supp.
1935).
24. Id. at 1091.
25. DEPT. STATE BULL. 570 (1951) (Three Power Communique of September 26,
1951).
26. Harvard Law School, op. cit. siopra note 23, at 661. Hyde writes: "It is
doubtless a sound proposition of law that in the case of a multi-partite treaty, super-
session by a later agreement calls for acquiescence therein by all -States that were
parties to the original arrangement." 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTER-
PRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 1522-1523 (2d ed. 1945); also see the
opinions of Judges Van Eysinga and Schficking in the Oscar Chinn Case, P.C.I.J.,
Ser. A/B No. 63 (1934).
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Peace Treaty. Italian action, lacking the necessary acquiescence of all
the signatories, seems hardly justifiable under the circumstances.
Writers who accept a right of unilateral denunciation are divided as
to the effect of a violation of one part of a treaty upon the validity of
the remaining parts, especially when an instrument, such as the Italian
Peace Treaty, embraces a wide variety of subjects. Fenwick states that
a majority of publicists arguing a priori insist that contravention of any
part of a treaty gives grounds for denunciation since it is impossible to
distinguish between essential and non-essential clausesY The more rep-
resentative standard, however, is that cited by Hall-it is only the failure
of one party to "observe a material stipulation, a stipulation which is
material to the main object, or, if there are several, to one of the main
objects," that justifies the other party in abrogating a treaty.28 Even
more recently Professor Kunz has written:
. . . where treaties consist of different parts, dealing with com-
pletely different subject-matters, it is now recognized by the ma-
jority of writers, by the treaties themselves, by international
tribunals, and by the practice of states, that the problem of the
validity or termination of treaty-created norms can arise not
only with regard to the treaty as a whole, but also with regard
to certain parts or articles of the treaty.29
If one accepts the former point of view, Italy could denounce the Treaty
if the rights of other states were not involved.
If one accepts the latter point of view, then the Italian position
becomes tenuous. The main objects of the Peace Treaty are boundaries,
reparations, colonies and armaments. The statement in the preamble
concerning admission to the United Nations seems wholly incidental and
not material to the primary purpose of concluding a peace settlement
with a defeated state. Certainly the failure to keep such a promise seems
to have little legal relation to the continuing validity of the armaments
and boundaries provisions.
It might be argued from the Italian position that the opportunity
to become a member of the United Nations had a very close relation
to the rest of the Treaty. The United Nations Charter, unlike the
Covenant of the League of Nations, contains no specific reference to the
27. FENwicx, INTERNATIONAL LAW 452 (3d ed. 1948).
28. HALL, A TEATisE Ox INTERNATIONAL LAW 409 (8th ed., Higgins, 1924).
This position is supported by, among others, BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 200 (3 ed.
1942) ; 2 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 26, § 546; OFPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 853
(6th ed., Lauterpacht, 1947) ; Harvard Law School, supra note 23, at 1134-1144.
29. Kunz, The Meaning and the Range of the Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39
Am. J. INT'L L 180, 194-195 (1945).
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possibility of future treaty revision.30 Nevertheless the Italian govern-
ment hoped to obtain revision through the United Nations in spite of the
negative results of the League in this respect. 31 Some of the victors
encouraged Italy in this hope. 32 Yet it cannot be said that the Allies
ever formally and collectively obligated themselves to revise the Treaty
at some. future date.3' Neither can it be said that Italy's signature to
the Treaty is based on the assumption that a right of revision exists,
inside or outside the United Nations. Italy had no choice but to sign.
The alternative was continued occupation.
An apparent exception to the statement that the Allies never form-
ally obligated themselves to revision might be found in Article 46 of
the Treaty:
Each of the military, naval, and air clauses of the present
Treaty shall remain in force until modified in whole or in part
by agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and
Italy or, after Italy becomes a member of the United Nations,
by agreement between the Security Council and Italy.34
Careful examination of the wording removes the exception, however.
There is nothing here granting a right of revision. The first part merely
restates a general principle of International Law that treaties remain
binding until revised by mutual consent of all the parties. The second
part demonstrates something of a change in that it permits revision by
agreement between the Security Council and Italy after the latter has
become a member of the United Nations. All signatories might not be
on the Security Council when revision is considered. Some of the
Security Council members might not be signatories to the Treaty. The
principal Allied and Associated Powers, however, have permanent mem-
bership in the Security Council so their agreement would be necessary in
either case, given the voting procedures prevailing in that organ of the
United Nations.3 5
Nothing in Article 46 obligates the Allied and Associated Powers
to reach any agreement with Italy on revision of the armaments clauses.
At best Article 46 creates a moral obligation to consider the issue in
30. See discussion infra.
31. Statement of Premier DeGasperi to the Constituent Assembly. Assemblea
Costituente, Verbale, July 31, 1947, pp. 6545-6546.
32. Ibid. (Letter of President Truman to Premier DeGasperi).
33. Foreign Minister Sforza on the date of signature of the Treaty, July 24,
1947, sent a circular note to the Allied and Associated Powers calling for a revision.
Id. at 6162. The Soviet Government replied, July 31, 1947, to the effect that the Treaty
was a good one and revision was therefore unnecessary. Id. at 6539.
34. U.S. TREATY SER., No. 1648, p. 143 (Dep't State 1947).
35. The Charter establishes the requirement of the concurrence of all permanent
members on substantive questions. U.N. CHARTER Art. 27.
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the future. At the time of the drafting of the document the Italian
government tried to insert an amendment requiring revision proceedings
to take place within two years after the Treaty had entered into force.36
The Italian effort was rebuffed. Italy has the right to bring up the ques-
tion and any of the other signatories may support the request, but without
the consent of all the Allied and Associated Powers, or of the Security
Council, there is no right to revise.
In discussing the question of treaty termination, some writefs
assert a principle akin to the concept of the Statute of Limitation:- This
proposition is expounded in terms, of reasonable or due time,37 but these
terms have never been defined. The first Soviet veto of Italy's application
for membership in the United Nations was cast on August 26, 1947.38
The Soviet veto in February, 1952, was the fifth on this issue, yet it was
only then that Italy acted. A presumption may be raised that the Italian
right had been waived. Thus, it appears that although the Soviet Union
seems to have violated an obligation to Italy, the latter, in any case, had
no right to relieve itself of certain obligations of the Peace Treaty,
especially the armaments clauses.
Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus
One of the most difficult questions in the law of treaties involves
the impact of changing conditions on the effectiveness of an international
agreement. The claim of a "change of circumstances" as relieving a state
of its treaty obligations has been a subject for discussion among the
major writers in the field.39
Machinery for eliminating obsolete or impolitic obligations is inade-
quate. There is no legislative body in the international community em-
powered to set aside treaty obligations on the grounds of a higher public
policy.40 Certainly the League of Nations never had this status, nor
does the United Nations. Under Article 19 of the Covenant, the League
Assembly could at best recommend to member nations the reconsidera-
tion of treaties which had become inapplicable. 4' This article remained
36. Paris Peace Conference, 1946, U.S. CONFERENCE SER. No. 103, p. 239 (Dep't
State 1947).
37. "The right to cancel the treaty on the ground of its violation must be
exercised within a reasonable time after the violation has become known. If the power
possessing such a right does not exercise it in due time it must be taken for granted
that such a right has been waived." OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 854 (6th ed.,
Lauterpacht, 1947). Also see 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 348 (1943).
38. U.N. SECURITY COUNcIL, Doc. S/P/V' 196, pp. 82-85 (Aug. 26, 1947).
39. For bibliographical citations see 5 HACKWORTH, op. Cit. supra note 37, at 349.
40. See BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 208 (3d ed. 1942).
41. Treaty of Peace With Germany, SEN. Doc. No. 51, p. 19, 66th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1919).
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a dead letter. No comparable provisions are found in the United Nations
Charter. In fact, one of the major purposes of the United Nations is
the establishment of conditions "under which justice and respect for
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law
can be maintained .... -42 The Security Council might advise revision
of treaties as part of its power to recommend peaceful settlements of
disputes. 43 And Article 14, which permits the General Assembly to make
recommendations for the peaceful adjustment of any situation likely to
endanger friendly relations, especially holds possibilities in this area.44
In all cases, however, the power of thhse United Nations organs is purely
recommendatory, and so, in reality, no greater than that available to the
League. It is still far removed from a real legislative power.
The doctrine of "changing conditions" as a basis for voiding treaty
obligations is accepted by most writers although there is considerable
difference of opinion as to its meaning and the circumstances under
which it can be properly invoked. There is no case on record where
both parties to a dispute have admitted its applicability or where the
doctrine has been defined or applied by an international tribunal.45
Some consider rebus sic stantibus as granting release from an obli-
gation when the conditions upon which it was founded have vitally
changed. This position is illustrated by an opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States to President Roosevelt in 1941:
It is a well established principle of international law, rebus sic
stantibus, that a treaty ceases to be binding when the basic con-
ditions upon which it is founded have essentially changed.46
Others consider the test to be whether the change in conditions
would be so injurious or damaging to a party as to justify termination
of the treaty.47 The most probable meaning, however, is the one ex-
pressed by Hyde.
That which causes a demand for performance to be unrea-
sonable, and which, conversely, clothes a party with freedom
to rid itself of the obligation to perform is the coming into
being of a new condition of affairs which was not only not
brought to the attention of the parties when they concluded their
agreement, but also one which, if it had been brought to their
42. U.N. CHATm (Preamble).
43. Id. Arts. 36, 37, 38.
44. Also see Id. Arts. 10, 11.
45. BmImLY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 205.
46. 40 Ors. ArT'y GEN. No. 24, pp. 119, 121 (1941). Also see 5 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 114 (1941).
47. For a description of this point of view and others see Harvard Law School
Research in International Law, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 1096-1126 (1935).
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attention, would have necessarily produced common acknowl-
edgement that the agreement would be inapplicable, and hence
permit a party to regard it as no longer binding in case that con-
dition or situation should subsequently arise. This requirement,
which refers the matter to the thinking of contracting parties
when they concluded their agreement, or to such implications
from their thought at that time as are impregnable, involves
primarily a fact-finding endeavour.48
This interpretation appears to be supported by the Perm.anent Court of
International Justice in its opinion in the "Free Zones" case. While
refusing to define the doctrine as the facts did not warrant a claim of
"changed conditions," the Court seemed to imply that the change must
be pertinent to conditions which were an element in the minds of the
parties inducing them to make the treaty.49
Applying a fact-finding endeavour to the conditions which might
have been in the minds of the parties to the Italian Peace Treaty and to
the pertinent changes, the conclusion appears to be that no "change of
circumstances" has occurred. Was the signatories' satisfaction with the
Treaty a factor in the completion of the Treaty and has their satisfaction
disappeared?
Let us examine the attitudes of the principal parties, Italy, the Soviet
Union and the Western Allies. The Italian government was unalterably
opposed to the major settlements of the Peace Treaty, especially the
Yugoslav boundary and the disarmament clauses.50 It is still opposed to
them today. The United States, Britain and France were against the
boundary settlement then, although they accepted it reluctantly.5 1 They
are against it today.5 2 They were less opposed to the armaments
48. 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED ,y THE
UNITED STATES 1524 (2d ed. 1945).
49. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex., P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No.
46 (1932). For a comment on this decision see BRIERLY, op. cit. supra note 40, at
206-207.
50. The Italian position can be found in the following sources: Italia, Ministero
Dell' Aeronautica, CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE WITH REFER-
ENCE TO THE PEACE TREATY (1946). Italia, Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, AIDE
MEMOIRE, CONSIDERATION UPON THE MEMORANDUM AND OTHER STATEMENTS SUB-
MITTED BY THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVES AT THE FIRST SECTION OF THE COUNCIL
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN LONDON IN SEPTEMBER 1945 (1946); GENERAL CONSIDERA-
TIONS REGARDING THE COMPOSITION OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES WITH REFERENqCE
TO THE PEACE TREATY (1946); THE ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF SECURITY. (1946); MEMORANDUM ON THE ITALO-YUGOsLAV FRONTIER (1945). Italia,
Ministero Della Guerra, CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE ITALIAN ARMY WITH REFER-
ENCE TO THE PEACE TREATY (1946). U.S. CONFERENCE SER., No. 103 (Dep't State 1947).
51. For a map showing the British, French and United States boundary recom-
mendations see THE WORLD TODAY, November, 1946, p. 503.
52. 25 DEP'T STATE BULL. 570 (1951) (Three Power Communique of September
26, 1951).
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settlement although by the time the Treaty became effective the United
States realized that modification of these terms might be desirable.53
France and Italy were already engaged in working towards an alliance
and customs union'.54 Britain and the United States, after signature and
ratification of the treaty, waived their share of the Italian fleet, returning
it for scrap. The Western Allies have sponsored the Italian request for
revision today.5" Apparently only the Russian attitude has changed. It
considered, the Treaty a good one and in no need of revision at the
time it was signed. 6 It was willing to consider revision of the armaments
clauses in 1951 in return for certain political considerations.57 Since the
present Italian government could not possibly accept these terms it is
easy to interpret the Soviet position as not showing a real change.
Was the nature of the world situation a factor in the minds of the
signatories which was related to their acceptance of the Treaty, and has
the world situation changed? This argument was made by the Italian
government in its note of December 8, 1951, requesting revision of the
Treaty.
The basic assumption was that universal adherence to the
principles of the United Nations Charter would assure the
security of all the democratic family of nations and therefore
would also assure Italy's status as an equal member of that
family.
The above assumption on the basis of which the Italian
Peace Treaty was signed and was ratified, has not been ful-
filled.58
Adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter meant com-
mitment to policies of peaceful relations. In other words the Peace
Treaty was presumably accepted on the assumption that the post-war
world would be peaceful, but today it is not peaceful.
In fact, there was no basis for the original assumption and there
has been no marked change in the world. For the Treaty came into
force in September, 1947, when the Soviet. ratification was deposited.5 9
53. Assemblea Costituente, Verbale, July 31, 1947, pp. 6545-6546 (Letter of Presi-
dent Truman to Premier DeGasperi).
. 54. On the Franco-Italian rapprochement see Sforza's statement to the Con-
stituent Assembly, id. at 6534. Also see Sforza, Italy, the Marshall Plan, and the
"Third force," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1948, p. 452.
; 55. See note 52 supra.
56. See note 33 supra.
.57. 25 DEP'T STATE BuLL 649 (1951).
58. Id. at 1011.
59. Article 90 of the Peace Treaty provided that the document became effective
when ratified by the principal Allied and Associated Powers. U.S. TREATY SER., No.
1648 (Dep't State 1947).
ITALIAN PEACE TREATY
At that time the "Cold War," -between the Soviet and Western blocs was
already in existence. Some have dated the beginning of the "Cold War"
from Russia's refusal, made at the conference in Paris in June-July,
1947, to participate in the Marshall Plan. Others have selected earlier
dates: Former Secretary of State Byrnes' attack at Stuttgart in 1946
on Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe; Winston Churchill!s speech
of 1946 in Fulton, Missouri; the struggle among the victors over the
Peace Treaty itself; the Russian ultimatum to Roumania in February,
1945, shortly after the Yalta Conference, or even the Russian charges
of separate peace negotiations in Northern Italy between the Western
Allies and Germany at the end of 1944. In any case, the "Cold War'?
was a fact when the Treaty became effective.
In 1947 there were civil wars in progress in Greece, China, Indo-
China, Indonesia and Burma plus a stalemate between the United States
and the Soviet Union over a settlement of the partition of Korea. -Four
power unity in the administration of Germany was collapsing. In De-
cember, 1951, the civil wars in Greece, China and Indonesia were over,
but those in Burma and Indo-China were still being fought. Germany
was still divided, and open warfare involving Communist Chinese and
the United Nations forces had been continuing for over a year in Korea.
The diplomatic tug of war was still in progress. The situation was cer-
tainly more critical but the change that had occurred was one of degree;
it was hardly drastic.
Even in the case of Italian security there has been no vital change.
When American occupation troops left Italy in 1947 after the Peace
Treaty came into force President Truman took the occasion to announce:
If . . . it becomes apparent that the freedom and independ-
ence of Italy . . . are being threatened directly or indirectly,
the United States . . .will be obliged to consider what meas-
ures would be appropriate.60
This guarantee is still the effective basis of Italian security. The com-
mitments of the North Atlantic Treaty are but formalizations. 1
Was completion of the Treaty conditioned" on ...the .exi stence of a
certaintype of internal regime in Italy and has that.regime changed?
Was it conditioned on relations between Italy and 'other nations and
have those relations changed? The United States government has as-
60. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1947, p. 1, col. 3.
61. The only commitment made by a party to the North Atlantic Treaty is,-in
case of armed attack, to take "such action as it deems necessary, including the. use -of
armed forces, to restore and maintain security in the North Atlantic area." -This
leaves it up to each party, in the last -analysis, to determine its obligations, and how
they shall be executed. N.A.T.O., Art. 5, U.S. TRaAr SmE., No: 1964 (1950).
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serted that the spirit of the peace settlement no longer accords with
Italy's present status as an active and equal member of the democratic
and freedom-loving nations. It has further asserted that all Italy has
accomplished since the war's end deserves recognition in the form of
revision.6 2
The original Italian position during the peace negotiations was that
the nation had been democratic and freedom-loving ever since Mussolini
was overthrown in 1943 and Italy participated in the war against Ger-
many as a co-belligerent on the side of the Allies. The Italian govern-
ment complained bitterly at the time of ratification that the document
failed to consider Italy's democratic political institutions and the con-
tribiution that it had made as a co-belligerent.6 3 Italy wanted the treaty
revised, not because of changes that have taken place since the peace
settlement, but because it considered that settlement unjust from the be-
ginning.
In a recent assertion of revision, however, the Italian government
shifted its position and adopted the American point of view that the
spirit of the peace treaty no longer coincides with Italy's present status
as an active and equal member of the democratic and freedom-loving
nations. 64 In fact, since the war there have been no significant changes
in Italian political institutions. The regime in power today is the regime
which has been in power since the end of hostilities.65 Italy is no more
or no less democratic and freedom-loving today than it was then. The
day the Treaty became effective Italy returned as an equal member of
the community of nations. Many of the other members are democratic,
many are not. Some of the democratic nations, Switzerland, for example,
are not in the United Nations. Italy maintains friendly relations with
almost all of them.
Even if there were a substantial change in the internal character of
a state this would be no basis for releasing that state from its interna-
tional obligations. International law supports, in general, the doctrine
of succession by governments to the international obligations assumed
for the state by earlier governments. 68  Nazi Germany was held respon-
62. American statement dated October 12, 1951. 25 DEP'T STATE BULL. 648 (1951).
63. See the resolution of the Constituent Assembly, Assemblea Costituente, Verbale,
July 31, 1947, pp. 6566-6567.
64. 25 DE,'T STATE BULL. 1011 (1951); N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1951, p. 1, col. 2.
65. The Italian Communists and their Socialist Allies were ejected from the
Cabinet in the Spring of 1947 before the Treaty became effective. However, they had
not been able to dominate the government during the period they were members of
the coalition of the Committee of National Liberation. This coalition formed the
cabinets of Italy from June, 1944 to 1947.
66. The Tinoco Arbitration, 18 Am. J. INT'L L. 147 (1924). The Harvard Re-
search group concluded that "unless otherwise provided in the treaty itself, the
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sible for the Treaty of Versailles signed by representatives of the Weimar
Republic. 67 It might be an act of political wisdom, on the part of the
other states, to revise treaties when there have been substantial changes
in the internal nature of a nation. Until they do so, however, the duty
to observe these obligations remains.
It is concluded, as a consequence, that an appeal to the clausula rebus
sic stantibus is an unjustified basis for termination of Italy's obligations.
Its use in this instance is extremely dangerous. 68
Relationship to Other Treaties
The Italian Peace Treaty was drafted concurrently with similar
treaties for Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. It has been
contended that there is an interrelationship among these treaties greater
than a mere coincidence in time. It has been further deduced that viola-
tions of their obligations by Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, especially
in the area of armed forces limitations, relieves Italy of its obligations
in this area.
Two comments can be made with respect to this argument. First,
two wrongs do not make a right. The three Soviet satellites have also
been charged with violation of the human rights and fundamental free-
doms clauses of their peace treaties. 69 This would hardly justify Italian
violation of the same obligations in its own treaty. Second, Italy is not
a party to the peace treaties with Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary and
has acquired no rights under those treaties.70  These states have not
violated any obligations to Italy which would relieve Italy of its similar
obligations. There is, in fact, no legal identification among any of the
obligations of a State under a treaty are not affected 'by any change in its govern-
mental organization or its constitutional system." Harvard Law School, Research in;
International Law, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 662, also see comment at 1044-1055 (1935).
67. JoURNAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 551 (1935).
68. "For political treaties and for the invocation of political changes in the
balance of power, the doctrine [rebus sic stantibus] is pernicious. In such situations
it would amount to the proposition that no peace treaty accepted by a defeated state
remains valid after that state recovers sufficiently or the victors weaken sufficiently
to make it politically possible for the defeated state to throw off the burden without
danger of another defeat. No more unsettling legal principle could be imagined; but
it would in fact, if accepted, reflect what has frequently occurred. For this very
reason the doctrine rebus sic stantlibus has been discredited." JEssUP, A MODERN LAW
OF NATIONS 150-151 (1948).
69. These charges were brought before the International Court of Justice by
Great Britain and the United States. See Interpretation of Peace Treaties With Bul-
garia, Hungary and Rounmania, PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, DOCUMENTS, I.C.J., pp.
20, 67, 257-330 (March. 1950).
70. ". . . [A] treaty only creates law as between the States which are parties
to it; in case of doubt no right can be deduced from it in favour of third States."
German Interest in Polish Upper Silesia, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 7, p. 29 (1926).
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above tremties. They were imposed upon the defeated states by the victors
at the same time. There the relationship ends.
Political Policy
The Soviet Union, in its reply to the joint American-French-British
memorandum urging revision of the Peace Treaty, offered to consider
the p'ossibility of revision of the arms limitations if Italy were to with-
draw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 71 Prime Minister
DeGasperi denounced the offer as blackmail and refused to consider it.72
The Soviets have not, as of this writing, offered to consider revision of
tj. Trieste settlement. On the contrary, in a note addressed to the three
Western powers they called once again for the continuation of the Free
Territory of Trieste and the appointment of a governor for the Territory
by the Security Council. They accused the three Western powers in
addition to Italy and Yugoslavia of planning the partition of the Free
Territory in violation of the Peace Treaty.73
The American government rejected the Soviet counter-proposal on
armaments in the following terms:
. . . the United States Government does not propose to be
deterred by such propaganda from its effort to find the way to
recognize Italy's new stature and its right to participate with
-other free nations in working for international peace and se-
curity.74
If it is admitted, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, that no grounds
for the Italian denunciation exists, then American acceptance and en-
couragement of Italy's action involves endorsement of illegality. 75
--- It should'hardiy be necessary to criticize any attempts to circumvent
the law even for the most noble of ends. In the particular case of the
United States, it would seem to be to the national interest of our country
to encourage respect for international obligations and legal procedures.
For the major part, the existing distribution of legal obligations in this
world favors the power position of the United States and its friends and
allies. In that sense we are a status quo. nation. Positive International
Law has always been a strong bulwark of the status quo and it is to our
benefit to promote respect for it.
7 6
71. 25 DEP'T STATE BULL. 649 (1951).
72. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1951,.p. 2, col. 6.
73. 25 DEP'T STATE BULL. 911 (1951).
74. Id. at 648.
75. The American acceptance of the Italian position was made in a note presented
to the Italian Ambassador on December 21, 1951. Id. at 1050.
76. The author does not wish to .imply that the United States should support
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As a case in point, we have seen how the position of the United
States and its friends has been damaged by Egypt. After Egypt unilat-
erally denounced its agreement with Britain on Suez and the Sudan,
former Secretary of State Acheson publicly lectured the Egyptians on the
necessity of observing their international obligations. 77 While it is recog-
nized that complete consistency on our part would in no way be a restrain-
ing force on those states which are determined to achieve their ends even
at the expense of law, nevertheless it seems of some importance not to pro-
vide propaganda ammunition for them to use. Thus, we would not want
to be put in the position of seeming to tell Italy to ignore its treaty when
it injures the Soviet Union while we tell the Egyptians they must obey
their treaties which benefit Great Britain directly and the United States
indirectly.
Consequently, we must ask ourselves whether the gains to be ob-
tained by revising the Italian Peace Treaty against Soviet wishes are
worth the reduced respect for International Law. This writer is in no
position, obviously, to have all the necessary facts to evaluate relative
gains or losses. Some attempt can be made, however, on the basis of
public knowledge.
The first presumed objective of revision is to achieve a settlement
of the Trieste problem that would give greater justice to Italy, reduce
Italo-Yugoslav tension, and lead to more friendly relations between
those two countries. The second probable objective is to raise the .size
of Italy's armed forces to enable that nation to make a larger contribution
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
The first objective could presumably be achieved by a partition of
the Free Territory of Trieste giving Zone A, containing the city of
Trieste, to Italy, and Zone B to Yugoslavia with perhaps some modifica-
tions.78 This writer considers the origina'l determination of the frontiers to
be unjust to Italy.70 If this change will satisfy all Italian aspirations it is
a reasonable one to make. The proposed solution would, from the Italian
point of view, however, be only a partial remedy leaving many Italian
the social and economic status quo in all parts of the globe. On the contrary, this is
believed to be the wrong policy to follow. What is meant is that the United States
benefits from the present distribution of power among the major powers and its
policy should be to hold on to this position. If disrespect for positive law is encour-
aged, it may be to our disadvantage.
77. 25 DEP'T STATE BULL. 647 (1951).
78. There has been some newspaper discussion of this possible solution. See
N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1951, p. 22, col. 7.
79. The standard of justice used is national self-determination, i.e., political
boundaries should coincide with ethnic ones. On this basis the revision of the Franco-
Italian frontier in 1947 was also unjust to Italy while the retention of the South Tryol
by Italy was unjust to Austria. A standard of justice other than national self-
determination would lead to different conclusions.
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territories still outside the frontier. The west coast of Istria, for example,
containing such formerly Italian-populated cities as Rovigno and Pola
is now in Yugoslavia and would remain there.8 0 To Italian nationalists,
limited gains might merely whet the appetite for further demands, with
the consequence that tensions between Italy and Yugoslavia would again
be aggravated in the future.
It must be remembered also that the Trieste settlement of 1947
was more than a compromise between Italy and Yugoslavia; it was a
compromise between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. Changing
that settlement involves more than the relative positions of Yugoslavia
and Italy; it involves the power position and prestige of the West versus
that of the Soviet Union,. even though Yugoslavia is no longer in the
Soviet bloc. It is impossible to predict the Soviet's reaction to a challenge
to their prestige in the area, but their well-known interest in the Balkan
and Danubian zone makes it certain that they would view such a threat
with great seriousness.81 These political, as well as the legal factors must
be taken into account in evaluating the available courses of action.
The real question is the effect of territorial changes on international
stability. In 1938 Nazi Germany claimed the Sudeten areas of Czecho-
slovakia on principles of national self-determination. There was little
question but that the predominantly German-speaking people of the region
wanted to become part of Germany at that time. The cession of the ter-
ritory to the Nazis at Munich met German demands but it started a
chain of events which led to the overthrow of the peace and security of
the world. 2 In judging any territorial claims the ultimate consequences
to world peace must always be considered as well as the immediate claim
for justice.
In any discussion of raising the arms limitations it must be re-
membered that as late as the end of 1951, after receiving substantial aid
from the United States for over five years, the Italian government was
unable to create the limited military establishment permitted it by the
Peace Treaty.' Italy has the potential to go above those limits in a very
80. In the spring of 1946 a four-power commission -composed of American,
British, French and Russian experts visited the area for the purpose of drawing a
boundary based primarily on ethnic grounds. The commission returned with four
different frontier lines. The American and British frontier proposals would have left
the area now called the Free Territory of Trieste plus Western Istria to Italy. The
French line became the eastern boundary of the Free Territory. The Russian line
would have given all of Venezia Giulia and even more, to Yugoslavia. See map in
THE WORLD TODAY, November, 1946, p. 503.
81. On the importance of this area to the Soviet Union see 2 BELOFF, THE FORFM..
POLICY OF SovIET RusSIA, 1929-1941, 320-384 (1949)_
82., Oni the Munich crisis see WHEELER-BENmzETT, MUNICH 'PROLOGUE To TRAGEDY
(1948).
83. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1951, p. 1, col. 2.
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minor way (a few more divisions at best), and then only with United
States financial aid. Its increased contribution to the defense of Western
Europe under such circumstances must be small.
Certainly, portions of the peace settlement were unjust. However,
the original injustice was a product not of ignorance of the Socratic
good but of the power struggle among the victors. The present support
for change is not the result of a recently awakened realization of the good
but of a different phase of the same power struggle.
Revision is not simply a case of formal justice versus "higher jus-
tice." The price to be paid for this "higher justice" is worth considering.
First, all the peace treaties of World War II including those yet un-
drafted become scraps of paper. The ex-enemy Soviet satellites can
now rationalize their violation of international obligations by claiming
that the spirit of the peace settlement does not accord with their present
status as equal members of the "peace-loving peoples democracies." The
Japanese treaty, and German and Austrian treaties, if and when con-
cluded, will be likewise subject to disregard on the ground of incom-
patibility with the ideological nature of some future government.
Second, the United States is, however inadvertently, abandoning the
general principle of governmental succession. We have held that a change
in the internal nature of a regime does not ipso facto relieve a state of its
international responsibilities. s4 It is a principle necessary for the main-
tenance of international order; without it, carrying the argument to a
ridiculous extreme, every time a political party comes into power any-
where the rest of the world must wonder what will happen to all previous
arrangements. It is therefore pertinent to question whether the gains
anticipated from supporting unilateral denunciation are worth the blow
to the doctrine of integrity of treaties.
84. The United States is a signatory to the Convention on Treaties adopted by
the Sixth International Conference of American States, February 20, 1928. Article 11
provides in part: "Treaties shall continue in effect even though the internal constitution
of the contracting States has been modified." Report of the Delegates of the United
States of America to the Sixth International Conference of American States 199
(Dep't State 1928).
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